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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
GERALD GARRETT, : Case No. 920054-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OP APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992) which grants original appellate juris-
diction to the Court of Appeals over appeals in criminal cases, 
except capital and first degree felonies. The defendant, Mr. 
Gerald Garrett, was convicted of possession of a stolen vehicle, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 
(Supp. 1991) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Was Defendant's trial attorney ineffective because she failed 
to challenge the prosecution1s use of its first three peremptory 
challenges to exclude the only minority members of the venire? 
2. Was Defendant's trial attorney ineffective because she offered 
a jury instruction on reasonable doubt which was given by the 
trial court which contained incorrect statements of law? 
3. Was sufficient evidence presented to sustain a conviction? 
With respect to the first and second issues, an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim presents a mixed question of law 
and fact. State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Where 
no claim of ineffectiveness has been presented to the trial court, 
an appellate court may review the record to determine on appeal 
whether counsel's performance constituted ineffective assistance 
as a matter of law. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 
F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
18-19. 
Insufficiency of evidence claims, such as that raised by 
the third issue, require an appellate court to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Gardner, 789 
P. 2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). If the evidence is so inconclusive 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt of 
the defendant's guilt, the appellate court must reverse the 
conviction. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES 
Any constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules rele-
vant to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the text 
of this brief. 
_ 9 _ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Gerald Garrett, was charged with one count of 
possession of a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, in viola-
tion of Utah Code Ann. §41-1-112 (Supp. 1991). (R. 5-6) Mr. 
Garrett was tried before a jury. At the close of the State's 
case, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charge on the grounds 
that (1) the State had failed to prove that Mr. Garrett possessed 
the vehicle knowing or believing it to be stolen; (2) the State 
had failed to prove that Mr. Garrett intended to permanently 
deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle; and (3) Mr. Garrett 
provided a satisfactory explanation of his possession of the vehi-
cle to officers. (R. 275-76) The trial court denied the motion. 
(R. 276) The jury convicted Mr. Garrett as charged. (R. 89) 
After being committed to the Utah State Prison for a 
90-day evaluation (R. 124), Defendant was sentenced to a term of 
incarceration of from one to fifteen years and fined. (R. 130) 
The sentence was stayed and Defendant was placed on probation for 
three years. (R. 130-31) Judgment was imposed on December 20, 1991 
(R. 130) (Addendum A) and a timely notice of appeal was filed on 
January 6, 1992. (R. 131a). 
FACTS 
On June 29, 1991, Gerald and Josephine Hood reported to 
police that their 1980 Cadillac Seville with Texas license plates 
was missing. (R. 230) Mrs. Hood had parked the car in a parking 
_^_ 
lot at 285 South 200 West in Salt Lake City the night before. 
(R. 228) Mr. Hood surmised that someone had taken his keys from a 
work bench in his son's garage the day before the car was reported 
missing. (R. 240-41) 
On Sunday, June 29, before the Hoods reported their car 
missing, Officer Kent Bigelow was patrolling near Pioneer Park on 
Salt Lake City's west side. (R. 252) Bigelow noticed a white 
Cadillac with Texas plates that "looked out of place being in 
Pioneer Park." (R. 252) Bigelow testified that the car was 
parked and "fully occupied" and that the person in the driver's 
seat had marks on his face and a bandaged hand. (R. 252-53) 
Approximately fifteen minutes after he left the area, Bigelow 
heard a broadcast about the Hood car. Bigelow immediately recog-
nized the car which he had seen at Pioneer Park as the stolen 
vehicle and responded accordingly. (R. 254) 
When Bigelow arrived back at Pioneer Park, other offi-
cers were already present and were taking people out of the car. 
(R. 255) Bigelow saw Mr. Garrett about forty yards away from the 
car and recognized him as the person who had been in the driver's 
seat earlier. (R. 255) Bigelow questioned Mr. Garrett about the 
car. Bigelow testified that Mr. Garrett stated the car belonged 
to Gerald Hood who had been arrested and whom Mr. Garrett was 
going to bail out of jail. (R. 255-56) Bigelow testified that 
Mr. Garrett indicated that the keys to the car were in his front 
pocket; Bigelow removed the keys from Mr. Garrett's pocket. 
(R. 257) 
Mr. Garrett testified that a man named Jerry with the 
car was in Pioneer Park earlier that morning and that Jerry and 
several other people, including Mr. Garrett, had gone to a grocery 
store to get food and beer. (R. 279-80) Mr. Garrett testified 
after the group returned to the park, Jerry gave him the car keys 
to turn on the radio and get beer from the trunk. When the police 
arrived, Mr. Garrett testified that Jerry told him to watch the 
car because he (Jerry) "might have a warrant." (R. 281) Mr. 
Garrett stated that he did not point Jerry out to police because 
he was never asked and the police "made up their mind that they 
were going to take me to jail." (R. 283) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On appeal, Mr. Garrett first asserts that his trial 
attorney was ineffective because she did not challenge the 
prosecutor's use of his first three peremptory challenges to 
remove the only three minority members from the jury panel. The 
use of racially motivated peremptory challenges is prohibited. In 
this case counsel's failure constituted deficient performance 
which prejudiced Mr. Garrett. 
The second issue raised on appeal concerns a reasonable 
doubt instruction proposed by defense counsel and accepted by the 
trial court. According to recent cases from the Utah Supreme 
Court and this Court, the instruction misstates the law on reason-
-5-
able doubt. By offering such an instruction, counsel's perform-
ance was deficient and prejudiced Mr. Garrett. 
The final contention on appeal is that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict Mr. Garrett. Specifically, no evidence 
was presented which indicated that Mr. Garrett intended to perma-
nently deprive the owner of the vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
The following prefatory material is applicable to the 
ineffectiveness issues raised in Points I and II. Ordinarily, 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are addressed by col-
lateral attack in habeas corpus proceedings; however, in some cir-
cumstances the claim may be raised on direct appeal. State v. 
Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Such 
circumstances exist when the defendant is represented by new coun-
sel on appeal and the trial record is adequate on the issue. 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133-34 (3d 
Cir. 1984); Johnson, 176 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18. The circumstances 
are present for this Court to review the ineffectiveness claim 
raised in this case on direct appeal. 
In cases involving ineffectiveness claims, Utah courts 
have adopted the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687 (1984): 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires show-
ing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show 
- 6 -
that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's 
errors were so serious as to deprive the defen-
dant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is 
reliable. 
See also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). In 
short, to demonstrate ineffectiveness, the defendant must demon-
strate deficient performance which resulted in prejudice. 
POINT I 
DEPENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE 
SHE FAILED TO OBJECT TO A CLEAR BATSON VIOLATION 
DURING JURY SELECTION BY THE PROSECUTOR. 
The jury venire in this case apparently included three 
minorities: Lisa Gallegos Turner, a Hispanic (although defense 
counsel failed to establish that fact) (R. 150-51); Siulavai 
Leota, a native Samoan (R. 153); and Ilaisaane Mokofisi, a native 
Tongan. (R. 157) Two of the three, Ms. Gallegos and Ms. Leota, 
answered only the perfunctory introductory questions asked by the 
trial court which indicated no bias against the prosecution. 
(R. 150-54) (Ms. Gallegos1 entire voir dire is reproduced in 
Addendum B while Ms. Leotafs voir dire appears in Addendum C. ) 
Ms. Mokofisi answered the general introductory questions 
(R. 156-57) and indicated that she had a friend who is a police 
officer but stated that that fact would not affect her 
impartiality. (R. 179-80) (Ms. Mokofisifs complete voir dire is 
found in Addendum D.) No other questions were asked of the three 
by either attorney or the trial court. The prosecutor's first 
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three peremptory challenges were Ms. Leota, Ms. Gallegos, and Ms. 
Mokofisi, in that order. (R. 86, Addendum E) The peremptory 
challenges were not contested by defense counsel or the trial 
court. Mr. Garrett now alleges that his counsel's failure to con-
test the prosecutor's actions constituted ineffectiveness. 
In this case defense counsel's performance was clearly 
deficient. Defense counsel did not contest the prosecutor's 
apparently racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges and did 
nothing to even preserve the record with regard to one of the 
venireman's ethnic or racial background. 
In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 203-04 (1965), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that a "State's purposeful 
or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participa-
tion as jurors in the administration of justice violates the Equal 
Protection Clause." In order to preserve the historical sanctity 
of the peremptory challenge, the Swain court refused to examine a 
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in any individual case. 
380 U.S. 221-22. Rather, in order to prevail on an equal protec-
tion challenge, a defendant was required to demonstrate 
continuous, systematic removal of minorities from venires by a 
prosecutor. 380 U.S. at 223. 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court 
eliminated the necessity for a defendant to demonstrate systematic 
discrimination. In Batson, the Court identified the harm done by 
discrimination in the jury selection process. "The harm from dis-
-8-
criminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the 
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. 
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from 
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system 
of justice." 476 U.S. at 87. The Court then outlined how a 
defendant could demonstrate discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges in an individual case: 
These principles support our conclusion that a 
defendant may establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination in selection of the 
petit jury solely on evidence concerning the 
prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges 
at the defendant's trial. To establish such a 
case, the defendant first must show that he is 
a member of a cognizable racial group, and that 
the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to remove from the venire members of the 
defendant's race. Second, the defendant is 
entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there 
can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges 
constitute a jury selection practice that per-
mits "those to discriminate who are of a mind 
to discriminate." Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 
[559] at 562, 97 L.Ed 1244, 73 S.Ct. 891 [at 
892(1953)]. Finally, the defendant must show 
that these facts and any other relevant circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecutor 
used that practice to exclude the veniremen 
from the petit jury on account of their race. 
This combination of factors in the empaneling 
of the petit jury, as in the selection of the 
venire, raises the necessary inference of pur-
poseful discrimination. 
Once the defendant makes a prima facie 
showing, the burden shifts to the State to come 
forward with a neutral explanation for chal-
lenging black jurors. Though this requirement 
imposes a limitation in some cases on the full 
peremptory character of the historic challenge, 
we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation 
need not rise to the level justifying exercise 
-9-
of a challenge for cause. But the prosecutor 
may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case 
of discrimination by stating merely that he 
challenged jurors of the defendant's race on 
the assumption - or his intuitive judgment -
that they would be partial to the defendant 
because of their shared race. 
476 U.S. at 96-97 (citations omitted).1 Thus Batson permitted an 
individual defendant to challenge a prosecutor's use of discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges in an individual case. 
In State v. Cantu, 778 P. 2d 517 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu 
II"), the Utah Supreme Court delineated the elements necessary to 
make a prima facie case in Batson-type cases.2 The Court stated 
the elements include (1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a 
showing that the excluded veniremen belong to a cognizable group 
!Any inference from Batson that the defendant and the excluded 
veniremen must be of the same race was recently dispelled by 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. , 113 L.Ed. 2d 411 (1991). Powers 
specifically held that a defendant may object to a prosecutor's 
racially-motivated use of peremptory challenges regardless of 
whether the defendant and the excluded veniremen are of the same 
race. 113 L.Ed. 2d at 428-29. In State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 
340 (Utah 1991), issued shortly after Powers, the Utah Supreme 
Court held "that no standing requirement exists which requires the 
defendant to be of the same race as the challenged juror." See 
also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488-520 (1990) (separate 
opinions of Kennedy, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.). 
2In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 595 (Utah 1988) ("Cantu I") the 
Court had previously stated that a prima facie case to attack a 
peremptory challenge under Batson was established by showing: 
(1) that [the defendant] is a member of a cogn-
izable racial group, (2) that the prosecution 
exercised peremptory challenges to remove from 
the panel members of the defendant's race, and 
(3) that all the relevant facts and circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecution 
used its peremptory challenges to exclude 
veniremen from the petit jury on account of 
their race. 
-10-
"under the representative cross-section rule,"3 and (3) a "showing 
that there exists 'a strong likelihood that such persons are being 
challenged because of their group association rather than because 
of any specific bias,1" 778 P.2d at 518 quoting People v. 
Wheeler, 22 Cal 3d 258, 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 905, 583 P.2d 748, 
764 (1978). 
If a prima facie case of discrimination is established, 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral 
explanation for the exclusion of the jurors in question. In Cantu 
II the Utah Supreme Court adopted criteria set forth in State v. 
Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1988), to evaluate a prosecutor's 
explanation. Slappy1s list of factors "that may cast doubt upon 
the legitimacy of a purportedly race-neutral explanation" because 
they "tend to show that the state's reasons are not actually sup-
ported by the record or are an impermissible pretext" include: 
(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared 
by the juror in question, (2) failure to exam-
ine the juror or perfunctory examination, 
assuming neither the trial court nor opposing 
counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling 
the juror out for special questioning designed 
to evoke a certain response, (4) the 
prosecutor's reason is unrelated to the facts 
of the case, and (5) a challenge based on 
reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who 
were not challenged. 
After Powers and Span the first two requirements have been elimi-
nated because those cases make the removal of a minority juror on 
account of race a Batson violation regardless of the defendant's 
race. 
3In State v. Span the Utah Supreme Court clarified the 
cognizability requirement. The Court held that the fair cross-
section standard of Wheeler was not applicable in equal protection 
-11-
Slappy, 522 So.2d at 22. 
In the context of this case, the issue is whether Mr. 
Garrett's trial attorney was ineffective because she did not 
attack the prosecutor's use of apparently racially-motivated per-
emptory challenges. Counsel's performance is deficient if it 
"falls below an objective standard of reasonableness" and 
"specific, identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance." State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Severance, 182 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 32, 34 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Clearly, Mr. Garrett's counsel should have been aware of 
the Batson issue. All four of the Batson cases decided by Utah 
appellate courts originated in counsel's office. State v. Span, 
819 P.2d 329, 330 (Utah 1991); State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1989); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 592 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Counsel was 
dealing with a prosecutor's office with a long history of discrim-
inatory juror selection practices. See e.g., Salt Lake County 
Attorney Trial Manual, 15-16 (1978) (Addendum F) . Because Mr. 
cases involving a Batson-type challenge. Rather, the Court stated 
that "the Castaneda - Biaggi test, which focuses on the 
intentional exclusion of an individual on the basis of membership 
in a group, is more appropriate to the Batson peremptory challenge 
case." 819 P.2d at 342 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 
(1977) and United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987) ) . 
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Garrett is Black (R. 193) and Powers v. Ohio which eliminated 
standing requirements to raise Batson challenges had been issued 
less than five months before, Mr. Garrettfs trial counsel's aware-
ness of the issue should have been heightened. The right at 
issue, a defendant's right to a fair trial, is not an inconsequen-
tial right; it is at the very core of our judicial system.4 
Counsel simply could not ignore such a fundamental right as part 
of trial strategy. 
Despite the incomplete record provided by Mr. Garrett's 
4Arguably, the prosecutor's apparently racially-motivated peremp-
tory challenges amounted to plain error which the trial court 
should have corrected. In Span, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Discriminatory peremptory challenges harm the 
individual criminal defendant and the juror who 
is the subject of discrimination, and they are 
an affront to the judicial system. Despite the 
long-standing tradition of restricting judicial 
interference in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, the judiciary cannot be a party to 
the discriminatory use of the challenge. The 
discriminatory peremptory challenge of a minor-
ity juror simply because a prosecutor believes 
that the juror's race may influence the juror's 
decision in the case is offensive regardless of 
the defendant's race. The assumption that a 
minority juror cannot fairly hear a case 
because of his or her race or ethnic origin 
simply has no place in the American system of 
justice. Such an assumption is antithetical to 
the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
819 P.2d at 340. If the "judiciary cannot be a party to the dis-
criminatory use of the challenge," then a judge should require a 
prosecutor to explain his apparently racially-motivated peremptory 
challenges without prompting from the defense. The constitutional 
violation would be obvious. See State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 
779 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
-13-
trial counsel, a Batson challenge could easily have been raised.5 
While virtually nothing is apparent from the record regarding 
juror Gallegos1 ethnicity, although she is arguably Hispanic, 
Jurors Leota and Mokofisi were clearly members of cognizable 
groups. For example, Ms. Leota stated, l!Ifm original (sic) from 
the island of Samoa, and Ifve lived in Hawaii, that's where I went 
to school at . . . ." (R. 153) Ms. Mokofisi stated "I was born 
and raised on the island of Tonga until I was twenty-first (sic), 
and we moved up to the United States with my parents.11 (R. 157) 
The jurors were members of cognizable minority groups as defined 
by Span, 819 P.2d at 342. 
Additionally there is a strong likelihood that the three 
women were challenged because of their group association rather 
than any specific bias. Cantu II, 778 P. 2d 15 518. For example, 
none of the three women was asked any questions by the prosecutor 
and none of the three demonstrated any bias toward the 
prosecution. Any reason given for striking any of these three 
women would be equally applicable to virtually all of the other 
jurors. Indeed, the only thing that distinguished these three 
women from any of the other jurors is their race and ethnicity. 
It is particularly egregious that these three were the subjects of 
the prosecutor's first three peremptory challenges. See e.g. E. 
5Trial counsel's failure to perfect the record on the Batson 
issue should, by itself, be considered deficient performance. 
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Krauss & B. Bonora, Jurywork: Systematic Techniques 
§4.02[2][b][ii] at 4-12 (1992). The "relevant facts and circum-
stances raise an inference that the prosecution used its peremp-
tory challenges to exclude" these three jurors on the basis of 
race in violation of Batson. Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595. A prima 
facie case could easily have been established. 
In Span the Utah Supreme Court firmly condemned the use 
of discriminatory peremptory challenges as an affront to the 
"American system of justice." 819 P. 2d at 340. Trial counsel's 
failure to even raise the issue can only be termed deficient. 
Ineffectiveness also requires a showing of prejudice to 
the defendant. However, in cases of constitutional error such as 
this a defendant's "conviction could only be affirmed by showing 
that the error was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State 
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) quoting 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See also State v. 
Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1988). Numerous studies and cases 
have discussed the impact that minority jurors have on the delib-
erative process. See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 
187, 193-94 (1946) (In rejecting the government's contention that 
an all-male panel drawn from diverse groups would be equally rep-
resentative as a panel which included women, the Court stated "a 
community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a 
community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one 
on the other is among imponderables."). See also Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 
U.S. 217 (1946); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754-58 
(Cal. 1978). The inclusion of such jurors alters the process and 
their deliberate exclusion is clearly prejudicial to a defendant 
and the justice system. The nature of the prejudice and who 
should bear the consequences of it were stated in Peters v. Kiff, 
407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972): 
Moreover, we are unwilling to make the 
assumption that the exclusion of Negroes has 
relevance only for issues involving race. 
When any large and identifiable segment of the 
community is excluded from jury service, the 
effect is to remove from the jury room quali-
ties of human nature and varieties of human 
experience, the range of which is unknown and 
perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to 
assume that the excluded group will consis-
tently vote as a class in order to conclude, 
as we do, that their exclusion deprives the 
jury of a perspective on human events that may 
have unsuspected importance in any case that 
may be presented. 
It is in the nature of the practices here 
challenged that proof of actual harm, or lack 
of harm, is virtually impossible to adduce. 
For there is no way to determine what jury 
would have been selected under a constitution-
ally valid selection system, or how that jury 
would have decided the case. Consequently it 
is necessary to decide on principle which side 
shall suffer the consequences of unavoidable 
uncertainty. See Speiser v Randall, 357 U.S. 
513, 525-526, 2 L. Ed. 2d 14670, 1472, 78 S. 
Ct. 1332 (1958); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
370-373, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 378-381, 90 S. Ct. 
1068 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In 
light of the great potential for harm latent 
in an unconstitutional jury-selection system, 
and the strong interest of the criminal defen-
dant in avoiding that harm, any doubt should 
be resolved in favor of giving the opportunity 
for challenging the jury to too many 
defendants, rather than giving it to too few. 
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(footnotes omitted). 
Mr. Garrettfs trial counsel was ineffective for her 
failure to raise and perfect the record on the Batson issue. This 
Court should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial or, 
in the alternative, remand for a hearing regarding the 
prosecution's basis for its challenges. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE 
SHE SUBMITTED A JURY INSTRUCTION WHICH WAS GIVEN 
BY THE TRIAL COURT WHICH DID NOT ACCURATELY 
CONVEY THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Defendant's counsel proposed, and the trial court gave, 
the jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt. The instruction 
stated in part: 
It is not required that the State prove 
guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is 
one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt 
is a doubt based upon reason and common sense 
—the kind of doubt that would make a reasona-
ble person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of 
such a convincing character that a reasonable 
person would not hesitate to rely and act upon 
it in the most important of his own affairs. 
The jury will remember that a defendant is 
never to be convicted on mere suspicion or 
conjecture. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . 
(R.32, 101). (The instructions in question are reproduced in 
their entirety in Addenda G and H. ) However, in offering this 
instruction, counselfs performance was deficient because the 
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instruction did not adequately convey the concept of reasonable 
doubt as defined by the Utah Supreme Court and this Court. 
In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989), 
a majority of the Utah Supreme Court adopted an analysis for the 
review of the appropriateness of a reasonable doubt instruction. 
That review essentially adopted the analysis of Justice Stewart 
expressed in dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 
(Utah 1989). This Court has noted that any reasonable doubt 
instruction must meet the Johnson analysis. State v. Pedersen, 
802 P.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Under the Johnson/Ireland analysis, acceptable reasona-
ble doubt instructions must first "specifically state that the 
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." Ireland, 77 3 
P. 2d at 13 81. Second, the Johnson/Ireland analysis requires that 
a proper reasonable doubt instruction does not state that a 
reasonable doubt "is one which would govern or control a person in 
the more weighty affairs of life." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381; 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32. The Utah Supreme Court stated that an 
instruction which discusses the "weighty affairs of life" "tends 
to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-
of-proof standard." Ireland, 773 P. 2d at 1381. This is so 
because, "Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a nor-
mal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another of 
either his or her life or liberty by voting to convict for a 
crime." Id. This Court has held that nothing in Johnson or 
Ireland requires that the reasonable doubt instruction "must spe-
cifically negate the 'weighty decisions of life1 analogy." 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32. However, clearly the proper reasona-
ble doubt instruction will not contain "weighty affairs of life" 
language. 
Finally, under the Johnson/Ireland analysis "it is 
inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a 
possibility . . . ." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1382; Pedersen, 802 
P.2d at 13 32. The prosecution burden must not be diminished 
because "a possibility may constitute a reasonable doubt." 
Ireland, 77 3 P.2d at 1382. A proper instruction may eliminate the 
possibility that a reasonable doubt can be based on a fanciful or 
wholly speculative possibility. Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 13 32. 
In Johnson, the following instructions which were com-
bined to describe reasonable doubt for the jury in that case were 
held to be erroneous: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
degree of proof that satisfies the mind and 
convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. It must 
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in 
the case. 
If, after an impartial consideration and 
comparison of all the evidence, you can hon-
estly say that you are not satisfied of the 
defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable 
doubt; but if, after such impartial considera-
tion and comparison of all the evidence, you 
can truthfully say that you have an abiding 
conviction of the defendant's guilt such as 
you would be willing to act upon in the more 
weighty and important matters relating to your 
own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
The law does not require demonstration of 
that degree of proof which, excluding all pos-
sibility of error, produces absolute 
certainty, for such degree of proof is rarely 
possible. Only that degree of proof is neces-
sary which convinces the mind and directs and 
satisfies the conscience of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it. 
Johnson, 774 P. 2d at 1147-48. A majority of the Supreme Court 
held that those instructions combined to misstate the law because 
they did not meet the requirements set forth above. 
In Pedersen, this Court held that the following instruc-
tion was a satisfactory expression of the law: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And 
in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether 
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is enti-
tled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden 
is upon the state to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require 
proof to an absolute certainty. Now by rea-
sonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based 
on reason and one which is reasonable in view 
of all the evidence. It must be reasonable 
doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful 
or imaginary or based on wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind, convinces the understanding of those who 
are bound to act conscientiously upon it and 
obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and 
women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of evidence in this 
case. 
_on_ 
Pedersen, 802 P. 2d at 1331. The Court stated that this instruc-
tion was satisfactory because it specifically stated that the 
State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt and the definition 
of reasonable doubt in the instruction did not "diminish and 
trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof 
standard.11 Further, the instruction did not eliminate the chance 
that a possibility could rise to the level of reasonable doubt. 
Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1332. 
In the present case, the instruction offered by defense 
counsel and given by the trial court failed all of the 
Johnson/Ireland requirements for an acceptable reasonable doubt 
instruction. First, the instruction does not "specifically state 
that the State's proof must obviate all reasonable doubt." In 
fact, the instruction does not even state that the defendant 
should be convicted "only if guilt is shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Pedersen, 802 P. 2d at 13 32. The instruction does state 
that "the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt," but the instruction never states that 
the defendant can be convicted only if the State shows guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the standard which the 
jury is to apply to convict is never stated. 
Second, while the instruction does not contain "weighty 
affairs of life" language, it substitutes, "the most important of 
his own affairs" language. Merely trading one trivializing con-
cept for another does not act to define reasonable doubt. The 
problem with such language is illustrated in Scurry v United 
States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D. C. Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 389 
U.S. 883 (1967), where Judge Skelly Wright stated: 
A prudent person called upon to act in an 
important business or family matter would cer-
tainly gravely weigh the often neatly balanced 
considerations and risks tending in both 
directions. But, in making and acting on a 
judgment after so doing, such a person would 
not necessarily be convinced beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that he made the right judgment. 
Human experience, unfortunately, is to the 
contrary. 
Justice Stewartfs concerns expressed in Ireland about the "weighty 
affairs" language are equally applicable to the "most important of 
his own affairs" language in this case. In Ireland, Justice 
Stewart stated: 
The mental process employed in deciding 
that someone has committed a crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt is different from the mental 
process employed in making decisions in the 
"more weighty affairs of life." In making the 
latter type decision, a person looks forward 
and makes a decision about future conduct. A 
degree of risk is always inherent in such a 
decision, and usually the degree of risk based 
on doubt about future events is significant. 
The process employed in making such decisions 
is only partly a matter of assessment of past 
facts; instead, the decision often rests on a 
degree of hope, determination, and frequently, 
personal resolve. In most cases, the decision 
is revocable, but whether or not revocable, it 
is at least salvageable. 
A decision to convict always looks 
backward; it is concerned only about resolving 
conflicting versions of factual propositions 
about a past event. It is always irrevocable 
as to the jurors. . . . A jury must have a 
greater assurance of the correctness of its 
decision, if it is to comply with the consti-
tutional mandate, than the individual jurors 
_oo_ 
are likely to have in making the "weighty" 
decisions they confront in their own lives. 
Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381. (Stewart, J., dissenting). In this 
case mere substitution of "important" for "weighty" cannot obviate 
the concerns expressed in Johnson and Ireland. 
Finally, the instruction in this case states that "It is 
not required that the State prove guilt beyond all possible 
doubt." In effect, the instruction states that reasonable doubt 
cannot be based upon a possibility. However, this directly con-
tradicts Johnson and Ireland. The Johnson/Ireland analysis 
clearly permits reasonable doubt to be based upon a possibility. 
The possibility cannot be "fanciful or wholly speculative" but the 
language in the instruction in this case does not mention fancy or 
speculation. The instruction only seems to eliminate the fact 
that reasonable doubt can be based upon a possibility. By doing 
so, the instruction minimizes the prosecution1s burden of proof. 
In other places, the instruction emphasizes the nature of the 
prosecutionfs burden of proof, but because of the trivialization 
of the burden, at best the instruction leaves jurors confused as 
to what that burden truly is. 
Counselfs performance in offering the reasonable doubt 
instruction was deficient. Johnson and Ireland were both issued 
by the Utah Supreme Court in 1989, and State v. Pedersen was 
issued by this Court in 1990. Counsel had all of these cases 
available with which to construct a proper reasonable doubt 
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instruction. However, an acceptable instruction was not offered. 
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. The defense in the case was based upon the explanation 
offered by Mr. Garrett in response to the accusation that he knew 
that the vehicle in question was stolen. Furthermore, the defense 
argued that Mr. Garrett's possession of the vehicle was merely a 
transitory thing and that he neither knew that the vehicle was 
stolen nor that he intended to permanently deprive the owner of 
possession of the vehicle. In such a case, the State should 
clearly have to obviate all reasonable doubt and the State's bur-
den should not be minimized by the trivialization of the impor-
tance of the decisions facing the jurors or by the fact that their 
decision may, in fact, rest upon a possibility. Counsel's failure 
to construct a proper reasonable doubt instruction was a deficient 
performance which prejudiced Mr. Garrett. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE. 
At the close of the State's case, defense counsel moved 
to dismiss because of the State's failure to establish a prima 
facie case. Counsel argued that the State had not proved that Mr. 
Garrett knew that the property was stolen or that he had the 
intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. (R. 27 5) 
The trial court denied the defendant's motion. (R. 276) 
In reviewing an insufficiency claim, the appellate court 
must "view the evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from 
it, in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). If "the evidence and its 
inferences are so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted,1" then 
the appellate court must reverse the conviction. State v. Moore, 
802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Petree, 
659 P. 2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). ff[S]o long as some evidence and 
reasonable inferences support the jury's findings, we will not 
disturb them." Moore, 802 P.2d at 738. 
Convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle in viola-
tion of section 41-1-112 require that the defendant be in posses-
sion of the vehicle knowing that the vehicle was stolen. State v. 
Graves, 717 P.2d 717, 718 (Utah 1986). The statue has a mens rea 
requirement which has not been precisely defined. However, at the 
very least, the mens rea required to commit the crime is "an 
intent to procure or pass title to the vehicle." State v. Basford, 
799 P.2d 228, 229 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The Basford Court also 
stated that "one of the elements of the crime must include some 
form of permanent deprivation, . . . " 799 P.2d at 230. Indeed, in 
Basford the conviction was reversed because the State failed to 
demonstrate that the deprivation was permanent and not temporary. 
In this case, the jury was instructed that to convict 
the defendant it must find that the defendant "possessed said 
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vehicle with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof." (R. Ill) 
"Purpose to deprive" was defined as "the conscious object to with-
hold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use 
under circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic 
value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost, or to 
restore the property finally upon payment of the reward or other 
compensation, or to dispose of the property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the owner will recover it." (R. 105) 
No evidence of the defendants intent to permanently 
deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle was presented to 
the jury. In meeting this Courtfs requirement that a defendant 
marshal the evidence which supports conviction the only evidence 
that even arguably supports any intent came from Officer Bigelow 
who stated that he recognized the defendant as the person in the 
driver's seat of the parked vehicle when he first saw it. Bigelow 
testified that when he stopped the defendant, the defendant said 
that the keys to the vehicle were in his front pocket and defen-
dant handed Bigelow the registration. (R. 257) The defendant, 
however, testified that he had the keys only to turn on the radio 
and retrieve some beer from the trunk of the vehicle. (R. 281) 
Furthermore, the defendant presented uncontested evidence that he 
was unable to drive a car because of a severe vision problem. 
(R. 278) This evidence made more likely the defendants explana-
tion that someone had given him the keys to the car for a tempo-
rary purpose. No evidence was presented that the defendant 
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intended to permanently deprive the owner of possession of the 
vehicle. Therefore, just as in Basford, this Court must find that 
insufficient evidence supported the State's case. The only con-
clusion that can be reached is that the defendant did not intend 
to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the defendant, Gerald 
Garrett, respectfully requests that this Court reverse his convic-
tion for possession of a stolen vehicle and remand the case to the 
trial court for either an evidentiary hearing on the basis of the 
prosecutor's challenges to jurors Gallegos, Mokofisi, and Leota, 
or for a new trial or, in the alternative, that the Court remand 
the case with directions that the charges be dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this /S—' day of June, 1992. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
CURTIS C. NESSET-
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies were 
delivered to the Office of the Attorney General, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, this day of June, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
vs. 
Gerald Garrett 
Defendant. 
Case No. . 
Count No. 
Honorable 
Clerk 
Reporter 
Bailiff 
Date 
Leslie Lewis 
E. Matheson 
C. Wilson 
M. Marks 
12-20-91 
D The motion of. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by C a^ jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of Possession o f a s to len veh i c l e , a felony 
of the 2 degree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by L. Remal , and the State being represented by R. Macdougall is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
D to a maximum mandatory term of. years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
Rl of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
K) and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $_ 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ 
•
/>v-\ 
Stayed 
_to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
D such sentence is to run consecutively with 
D upon motion of D State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) 
D 
are hereby dismissed. 
h Defendant is granted a stay of the above (d( prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of 3yrS , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
• Commitment shall issue ^ ^Q 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney 
CO J 30 
Page — of 
(White—Court) (Green—Judae) fYellow—Jail/Pnson/APAPi /Pmk_n*>fonco\ /n«iH««r«w_c.- i 
Judgment/State , G e r a 1 d G a r r e t t /CR^^ Honorable i f i l H ^ 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
ffl Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept. of Adult Probation & Parole. 
D Serve 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing 
0 Pay a fine in the amount of $^2? 55 at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or • at the rate of +?5% surrhargp 
D Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or • in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or D at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete any Spe below program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or • vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or • with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with ! 
$ Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs& a lcoho l 
05 Submit to drug testing. 
ffl Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
$ Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. & a l coho l 
d Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
55 Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
01 Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Maintain full-time employment. 
01 Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling, when released from Orange S t r e e t 
D Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of days in jail. 
55 Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence. 
ft Defendant Is. to enter.Into,and .complete the Orange Street Community Correctional 
D Center tor the mentally 111 Offender Program 
ft Defendant fs not to take prescribed mpHiration without thp pprwrissinn of APftP. 
ft Defendant is to attend at least 1 AA meeting pbr week when released from Orange Street, 
ft Defendant i s to he he ld i n j a i l u n t i l hpH sparp hprnmps ava i l ah l p at Hrangp S t r p p t 
D ^z. „ ,/y . 
DATED this 7^day of ^ ^ 0 ^ , 19^/ /J / ^ 
Page O f ^ T 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
n.om 
ADDENDUM B 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right, thank you so much. I 
think all of the activities that everyone has listed so far 
are more interesting than spending the day in court. So 
again, let me thank all of you. 
Ms. Gallegos. 
MS. TURNER: Yes, my name has changed, I'm 
married now. 
on 130 
20 
THE COURT: All right. And what is your last 
name presently? 
MS. TURNER: Turner. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you for that 
correction. And what is your address, Ms. Turner? 
MS. TURNER: It's 7927 Linton Drive in West 
Jordan. And I'm a nurse's aide, and I've gone through high 
school, and taken classes of different sorts. And my 
spouse's name is Gerald Turner, and he's an insulator, and 
he has a high school education. And I have two children, 
ages fourteen and almost two, and they don't work. 
THE COURT: All right, and you said your husband 
is an insulator. With what company is he employed? 
MS. TURNER: Right now he's working at Geneva 
Steel. 
THE COURT: All right. And would you indicate 
for us whether or not you've ever lived in any state other 
than Utah? 
MS. TURNER: No, I haven't lived in any other 
state. 
THE COURT: All right, and what are your sources 
of information? 
MS. TURNER: Newspaper, TV, radio, magazines. 
THE COURT: And your leisure time activities, or 
hobbies or interests? 
p-iii 
1 
2 
3 
4 
MS. TURNER: Sports of all sorts. And I don't, 
I'm not with any clubs or organizations. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you so much, Ms. 
Turner. 
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ADDENDUM C 
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And will you stand and produce your last name for 
roe? I'm not even going to attempt to. 
MS. LEOTA: My name is Siulavai Leota I live at 
5119 West Verdugo Drive in Kearns, and I work for the Utah 
State Tax Commission for the Department of Motor Vehicle at 
the fairgrounds. And I have two years of education with 
junior college. And my husband's name is Vai, he works for 
the LDS Church. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't get his name. 
MS. LEOTA: Vai, V-a-i. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MS. LEOTA: And he works for the LDS Church. 
THE COURT: What does he do for the LDS Church? 
MS. LEOTA: He works maintenance. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, ma'am, you indicated 
that you worked for the Utah Tax Commission in the Motor 
Vehicle Department. Could you tell us a little bit more 
about what your duties are? 
MS. LEOTA: I'm an assistant supervisor for the 
data processing department, and we do input for 
registration for all cars and boats and ATVs and 
COMPTTTTTDT»7T?n mT^* %r~ ~ ~ 
snowmobiles and everything. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you have any children? 
MS. LEOTA: I have six children. 
THE COURT: What are their ages? 
MS. LEOTA: Twenty-six, twenty-four, twenty-two, 
twenty, sixteen, and a seven year old. I have four girls 
and three boys. 
THE COURT: All right. And as to the adults, 
what do they do for a living? 
MS. LEOTA: Okay, my son works for, the 
twenty-six year old works for the Huish Detergent. And my 
twenty-four year old daughter—they're all married—she 
works for the Marriott Hotel, in their administration 
office. And then I have two at home, sixteen and 
seventeen. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. And what are 
your sources of information? 
MS. LEOTA: Okay, newspaper, TV, radio, and 
magazines. But I have, I'm original from the island of 
Samoa, and I've lived in Hawaii, that's where I went to 
school at, and then I went to California, I lived in 
California. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Let me ask you 
this. Do you have any leisure time activities or hobbies 
or interests? 
oo1 
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MS. LEOTA: Well, sports. 
THE COURT: All right, and clubs or organizations 
that you belong to? 
MS. LEOTA: I don't belong to any organizations. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
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1 THE 
Ms. 
justice. 
MS. 
COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Mokofisi. I'm sure I 
MOKOFISI: My name is 
I live on 9041 South Kenyon Circle, 
occupation, I 'm a licensed day care, 
did not do 
Sacco. 
that 
Ilaisaane Mokofisi, 
West Jordan 
, and I baby 
my neighborhood. And my level of education, I1 
high school. 
THE 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
My husband's name is Asaeli. 
COURT: Can you spell 
MOKOFISI: A-s-a-e-1-: 
COURT: All right. 
MOKOFISI: And he's a 
that for us 
L . 
mail clerk 
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ve completed 
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at the 
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postal service, and he got an associate degree in 
accounting. I have two kids of my own, and I raised one. 
The age of my son is thirteen, and a daughter is eleven, 
and the youngest one is my brother-in-law's, he's in the 
navy but I take care of her, she's three. And they're all 
in school except the little one. 
I was born and raised in the on the island of 
Tonga until I was twenty-first, and we moved up to the 
United States with my parents. And all the sources of 
information. And I love camping, travel, and I'm not 
belong to any organization. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Miss Mokofisi. 
1/ W* ^ (t 
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THE COURT: The next hand raised? Miss Mokofisi. 
MS. MOKOFISI: I have a personal friend, my next 
door neighbor, he's a police officer, and he works in West 
Jordan. 
THE COURT: All right, do you believe you could 
be a fair and impartial juror, even knowing that you have a 
neighbor who's involved in law enforcement? 
MS. MOKOFISI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you believe that you 
could give the same credence to the testimony of a police 
officer as any other witness? That is, giving it no 
greater or lesser weight than the testimony of any other 
witness? 
00.1 ?3 
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MS. MOKOFISI: Yes. 
THE COURT: And that was a yes? 
MS. MOKOFISI: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Any other hands raised on 
this? Let's see, we also have Ms. Parker, and we also 
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ADDENDUM F 
1. General 
a. Juror is disqualified fro^ n serving in any case: 
i Felony conviction 
ii. Want of any legal qualification rendering a person 
a competent juror. 
iii. Unsoundness of mind or body rendering him incapable 
of performing juror duties (17-30-17, Utah Code 
Annotated) 
2. Particular 
a. Juror is disqualified from serving in action on trial 
i. Implied bias 
(a) Existence of facts ascertained renderning 
juror's mind contra to impartiality, 
(b) Lxistence of state of juror's mind contra to 
impartiality (77-30-18, Utah Code Annotated) 
III 
JURY SELECTION -- MECHANICS 
After each side has exercised both preemptory challenges and 
challenges for cause, if any, the panel will be selected. In 
misdemeanor matters, the jury panel may consist of four jurors 
and in felony matters of eight jurors. 
In making challenges, the baliff will hand the attorney for the 
defendant first a card bearing the names of all of the jury 
panel; at which time counsel for the defense will strike his 
first preemptory challenge indicating that it is defendant's 
Bur.ber one challenge and placing his initials after the challenge 
Th* card ^"11 then be passed to the State who will exercise his 
first prei.i:.ptory challenge in the same fashion and this will 
oc?fr until the specified number of preemptory challenges have 
bet: exerciced. The panel will then be selected and sworn. 
Jurr: Qualifications 
1. While there is no specific rule as to which individuals make 
good jurors favorable to the prosecution, as a general rule, 
the following classifications can be asserted generally: 
a. Technical professionals Good jurors 
b. School teachers Poor jurors 
c. Minorities 
d. Minorities 
e. Physically mfirmed 
f. The very young 
g. The very old 
h. Caveat 
i. Civil service 
j. Ex-military 
k. Artists and Musicians 
1. Bartenders 
m> Insurance men 
n. People wearing sunglasses 
o. Some law training 
p. social workers 
Poor for blue collar crimes 
Good for white collar crimes 
Good jurors 
Poor jurors 
Good jurors 
Watch for hearing problems 
Good jurors 
Good jurors 
Poor jurors 
Poor jurors except on robbery 
Very good jurors 
Poor jurors 
Poor jurors 
Poor jurors 
AS A <;ENE?AL RULE, ALWAYS GET RID OF THE ODD JUROR, I.E., WOMEN'S 
IIBBER, H1TPY TYPES, THE REVOLUTIONARY, ETC. 
AS A RULE OF THUMB, WHEN IN DOUBT -- STRIKE 
C. The Voire Dire 
1. Voire Dire examination in Utah courts is generally done by 
the trial judge. Many prosecutors tend to let the judge do 
all of the work, but there may be certain questions that 
the judge will not ask or not ask properly that the prose-
cutor will want to ascertain. The prosecutor may ask the 
questions himself, but more properly he should request of 
the Court that a specific question be asked the individual 
juror or the panel in general. A prosecutor should be par-
ticularly mindful of the following*kinds of cases and proceed 
with a more detailed and complex voire dire if you feel 
that the judge has not properly examined the panel. The 
following kinds of issues should be dealt with some care on 
voire dire: 
a. Qualification in capital cases. 
b. Circumstantial evidence, i.e., not second class evidence 
(16) 
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AUG 1 6 1991 
CANDICE A. JOHNSON, (#4745) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
Plaintiff, : 
v. 
GERALD GARRETT, : Case No. 911900988FS 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
Defendant. : 
The defendant, GERALD GARRETT, by and through his attorney 
of record, CANDICE A. JOHNSON, respectfully request this court in 
its charge to the jury to submit Instruction Nos. 
through inclusive. 
DATED this the )l/> day of August, 1991. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Jury Instructions to 
Ernie Jones at the office of the Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, this the / ^ day of August, 
1991. 
... r wmr»n 
Deouty C'OJK 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus 
a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate" 
— with no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but 
legal evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support 
of any charge against the accused. So the presumption of innocence 
alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after 
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the 
case. 
It is not required that the State prove guilt beyond all 
possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense — the kind of 
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a 
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to 
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs. 
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be 
convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant; 
for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the 
burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
00032 
So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration 
of all the evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant is guilty of the charge, it must acquit. If the jury 
views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of 
two conclusions — one of innocence, the other of guilt — the jury 
should of course adopt the conclusion of innocence. 
- 2 -
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AUG 2 6 1991 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GERALD GARRETT, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 911900988 FS 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant GERALD GARRETT, is 
charged by the information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE. The Information 
alleges: 
POSSESSION OF A STOLEN VEHICLE, a Second Degree Felony, 
at 2315 South 200 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
or about June 30, 1991, in violation of Title 41, Chapter 1, 
Section 112, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendant, GERALD GARRETT, a party to the offense, had in his 
possession a vehicle which he knew or had reason to believe had 
been stolen or unlawfully taken; 
00090 
INSTRUCTION NO. / 3 
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus 
a defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate" 
— with no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but 
legal evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support 
of any charge against the accused. So the presumption of innocence 
alone is sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after 
careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the 
case. 
It is not required that the State prove guilt beyond all 
possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense — the kind of 
doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt must, therefore, be proof of such a 
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to 
rely and act upon it in the most important of his own affairs. 
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be 
convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture. 
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant; 
for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the 
burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
OO.l Oi 
So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration 
of all the evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a 
defendant is guilty of the charge, it must acquit. If the jury 
views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting either of 
two conclusions — one of innocence, the other of guilt — the jury 
should of course adopt the conclusion of innocence. 
- 2 -
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